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THE SELF-PROCLAIMED MONTENEGRIN 
ORTHODOx CHURCH – A PAPER TIGER 
OR A RESURGENT CHURCH?
Abstract: During the early nineties, a so-called nationalized and traditional 
Orthodox community has been revived in the republic of Montenegro. This 
community calls itself the Montenegrin Orthodox Church and claims to be 
the representative of a resurgent form of the traditional Orthodox Church in 
Montenegro, which according to themselves vanished in the formation of Yu-
goslavia in 1918. Since 1993 they have therefore tried to claim local traditions, 
customs and places as part of their revitalized “Montenegrin” version of East-
ern Orthodoxy.
Up until now the research on this community has been limited and has only 
focused on the – often violent – struggle between this community and the Ser-
bian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral. It is difficult 
to grasp the reach and extent of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in these 
studies – is the community a paper tiger or an actual existing and thriving 
church? This study will focus on a selection of religio-sociological key findings 
on this community in order to provide a more nuanced description of them. 
The emphasis will be on this community’s existence and a discussion about 
the degree to which the transformation of Montenegrin society and the inde-
pendence of the Montenegrin state at large have contributed to the formation 
of this organization.
Key words: Montenegro, religion in Montenegro, Orthodox Church, nation-
alization on religion, religion post-communisme.
Society and religion in Montenegro
During the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia and the subsequent civil 
wars in the late eighties and nineties, the religious and social landscape in 
the republic of Montenegro changed. This change was first and foremost vis-
ible in the ethnic composition of the majority of the Slavic speaking popu-
lation.1 Until the early nineties, the majority of the Slavic speaking popula-
1 In the following article “ethnicity” and “nationality” will be used as translations of 
the Serbian word “narod”. This is a simplification, because the meaning of “narod” 
is much wider and more fluid, see Kolstø, 2014.
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tion identified themselves as being Montenegrins and only small minority 
saw themselves as either Serbs or Yugoslavs. This changed during the nine-
ties as a significant proportion of Montenegrin citizens began to identify 
themselves as Serbs while the self-identification as Yugoslav slowly vanished. 
This change was not due to any major migration or other sort of external 
changes in the country’s demographical composition, but was rather a sign 
of the political turmoil and change in the republic.
Table 1: Percentage of total population of Montenegro identifying 
themselves as Montenegrins, Serbs and Yugoslavs
1981 1991 2003 2011
Montenegrins 68.50% 61.86% 43.16% 44.98%
Serbians 3.32% 9.34% 31.99% 28.73%
Yugoslavs 6.46% 4.25% 0.00%  -
Source: Montestat
The period from 1986 to 1999 when dissolution and civil wars shaped new 
states in the Balkans a distinct Montenegrin nationalist movement began 
to rise. This movement found fertile ground in the Montenegrin society in 
the early nineties – as other nationalistic movements did throughout the 
Balkans. The national movement’s primary objective was a detachment of 
the former Socialist Republic of Montenegro from the Serbian state. The in-
dependence of the Montenegrin state was crucial, according to this move-
ment, in order to preserve the distinct Montenegrin national identity from 
its Serbian counterpart. At the same time, the rise of Serbian nationalism 
also influenced Montenegrin society. Several Serbian nationalists argued 
that the Montenegrin majority population and the Orthodox population 
were Serbs, thereby denying that the Montenegrin identity was something 
more than a mere toponym (referring to the name of a place). A large group 
of Slavic-speaking Montenegrin citizens therefore began to identify them-
selves as Serbs rather than Montenegrins. These two-opposite movements 
heavily politicised the question of Slavic-speaking Montenegrin citizens’ 
ethnic identity (Morrison 2010, Džankić 2013, 2016).
During the same period, as several social scientists remarked, religion 
once more became a central hallmark and sign of a national identity (Lampe 
2010). The question of national identity therefore also became a question of 
religious belonging. This manifested itself in the intertwinement between 
the Serbian nationalist movements and the Serbian Orthodox Church, which 
Klaus Buchenau aptly describes as a “sacralisation of the nation” (2012). 
Montenegrin nationalists therefore identified the local branch of the Ser-
bian Orthodox Church, known as the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and 
the Littoral, from hereon the MML, as the main opponent of Montenegrin 
independence. The Montenegrin nationalists accused the MML of being 
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the stronghold of Serbian nationalism in Montenegro.2 A key point in the 
Montenegrin nationalist political program therefore became to counter the 
influence of the MML in Montenegro. A step towards this goal was the for-
mation (or the so-called revival) of a Montenegrin Orthodox Church (mng.: 
“Crnogroska Pravoslavne Crkve”, from hereon CPC) in 1993. The Liberal 
party played a major role in the formation of this church according to them-
selves and most external observers (Morrison 2009). Until 2000, the CPC 
was registered as a non-governmental organization and simply called the 
“The Religious Community of Montenegrins of Eastern Orthodox Confes-
sion” (mng.: “Vjerska zajednica Crnogoraca istočnopravoslavne vjeroipoves-
ti”). Along with the formation of this organisation, the Liberals also helped 
to establish a whole branch of Montenegrin political and cultural institu-
tions, such as “The Cradle of Montenegro” (founded in 1993, mng.: “Ma-
tica Crnagorska”) and the Dukljan Academy of Science and Arts (founded 
in 1999, mng.: “Dukljanska Akademija Nauka I Umjetnosti”). The forma-
tion of these “pro-Montenegrin” organizations coincided with a watershed 
in Montenegrin politics in 1996–97. The former monolithic socialist party 
split into two groups, one pro-Montenegrin and the other pro-Serbian. The 
pro-Montenegrin party was formed under leadership of then Prime Minis-
ter Milo Đukanović, and has remained in control of the government since 
1996 (Morrison 2009). Đukanović and his government endorsed the pro-
Montenegrin organization, including the CPC, as part of his campaign for 
Montenegrin independence that culminated in a referendum in 2006 after 
which Montenegro became an independent republic.
These political and cultural transformations in the Montenegrin republic 
were also noticeable in its religious demographics as table 2 shows.
Table 2: Religious communities in Montenegro (adherents 
as a percentage of the total population)
Religious community 1953 1991 2003 2011
Orthodox 45.84 69.12 74.23 72.07
Islam* 17.65 19.18 17.74 19.11
Roman Catholic 4.81 4.41 3.54 3.44
Atheist 31.46 1.6 0.96 1.24
Source: Bakrac 2012, p. 116
2 The Montenegrin territory is at the present time part of two other Serbian eparchies 
as well, but the MML is the dominant voice for the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
Montenegro – and hence the MML will be used as a label for the Serbian Orthodox 
Church within Montenegro.
* Originally the category of Islam and Muslims were separated in the official census, 
but the Islamic Community strongly rejected this division and their reaction re-
sulted in the merging of the categories and an official apology from the Statistics 
Agency.
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Montenegro’s religious demographics changed remarkably from the 
eighties until the last census in 2011. The major change was that the large-
ly secular and non-religious majority population became mostly religious 
within a few years, which was a trend throughout the Yugoslav republics. 
According to a study, only 45% of the total population in all Yugoslav re-
publics in 1984 declared that they were religious believers (Perica 2002). 
Seven years later in 1991 this number had risen to 91.6% in Montenegro 
(Montestat). The change is mainly due to the close connection between re-
ligion and national identity which is characteristic of the post-Yugoslav pe-
riod in the Balkans (Bakrač 2012). The revival of religion in Montenegro 
was similar to the changes seen in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia 
(Bakrač & Blagojević 2013, Morrison 2009, Buchenau 2012). The CPC was 
born out of this religious revival process and it is regarded to have been at 
an early stage in the nineties as a manifestation of growing national self-
awareness amongst Montenegrins (see Bieber 2003, Šistek 2010, Kube 2012, 
Jelena Džankić 2014 & 2016).
Studies of the CPC
The CPC has been studied in a few social scientific articles (Morrison 2009, 
Šistek 2010, Kube 2012, Jelena Džankić 2013 & 2014a & 2014b & 2016 and Troch 
2014). The main findings throughout these studies are that the CPC is – in vari-
ous wording – a Montenegrin nationalist organization that promotes the idea 
that Montenegro has a separate culture, language, ethnicity and religion. Most 
of the studies are based on newspapers and online articles and a few site visits. 
All of the mentioned studies do not deal with the concrete social-reli-
gious formation of the organization in detail. This is mostly because it is 
not the subject of their studies, but it nevertheless leaves a blind spot. A 
second noticeable thing in these studies is that they deal with the CPC 
as a homogenous organization that has remained unchanged through-
out the post-Yugoslav period. Finally the focus of most of the studies 
is on the time before and during the crucial stages of the Montenegrin 
way to independence. The has left the period after 2006 unexamined. 
In the following, the CPC will be described differently and hopefully this 
will provide a more nuanced picture of it. The first and foremost aspect 
that needs to be dealt with in order to determine the CPC’s social-religious 
role in Montenegrin society is the determination of a few basic structures 
of the organization. These structures are basic things such as the location 
of the churches, the demographics of the community, the major events and 
conflicts the CPC has been involved in and what the community thinks of 
itself. This will provide a point of departure into a discussion of the CPC’s 
place in Montenegrin society.
This study is mainly based on my own field-work, interviews and site 
visits in 2011, 2013 and 2014, combined with the CPC’s own publications, 
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such as its constitution and its ecclesial magazine Lučindan. To some extent, 
other materials such as articles from the Magazine Matica Crnagorskam 
and data from local NGOs and scientific papers will also be used to sup-
port the observations.
The foundation of the CPC
The CPC was founded in Cetinje in 1993 in the days around St. Luke’s 
day (18. October) and St Petar’s death day (31 October). The foundation of 
the CPC took place in Cetinje and not in the capital of Podgorica, because 
Cetinje is the cultural capital of “Old” Montenegro and was, until the fall of 
the Montenegrin Kingdom in 1918, the city where its royal family resided. 
The city was originally founded by the noblemen Ivan Crnojević around a 
monastery where the Orthodox Metropolitan of Zeta (later Montenegro) 
took residence after the Ottoman invasion in the 16th century. The region 
around Cetinje (called Katunska nahija) is, according to the 2011 census, 
inhabited to a large extent by people who identify themselves as belong-
ing to the Montenegrin ethnicity and who vote for the parties that sup-
port Montenegrin independence. The CPC is claimed to be a revival of the 
Orthodox Church organization that existed in the historical Kingdom/
Principality of Montenegro until it was absorbed into the Serbian Ortho-
dox Church in 1920 after Montenegro became a part of the new Kingdom 
for Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918. The dismantling of the Montene-
grin Kingdom and church is a highly controversial subject in Montenegro, 
where pro-Montenegrins claim that both things were done illegally by the 
Belgrade government and its army (see Sekulović 2010). During the period 
of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro (from 1945 to roughly 1989), there 
were a few instances where the Orthodox clergy in Montenegro expressed 
the wish to form a local Montenegrin Orthodox Church as the case was in 
Macedonia. The Serbian Orthodox Church continually denounced these 
claims and argued that the wish had been nurtured by anti-Orthodox at-
titudes from the communist regime (Alexander p. 169, 180). The wish to 
form an independent (called autocephaly) Montenegrin Orthodox church 
is therefore not a new invention.
 
The CPC’s churches and religious sites
According to various sources, the CPC has an estimated 10–15 churches 
and at least one monastery in Old Montenegro. The sources range from the 
CPC’s wikipedia page, their magazine Lučindan, my own fieldwork and 
Jelna Džankić’s studies (2016). It is estimated that there are between 571 and 
650 Orthodox churches in Montenegro and the MML owns the rest as well 
as at least 60 monasteries in the Montenegrin territory (Džankić 2015, p. 
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123, Buchenau 2003, p. 110). Most of the CPC’s churches are found around 
the village of Njeguši near Cetinje. Njeguši is the birthplace for the clan of 
Petrović-Njegoš, who ruled Montenegro from the 17th century until 1918. 
The precise number of churches and monasteries is uncertain because the 
CPC frequently use ordinary houses (and refers to them as churches) or 
open fields as places for religious services (Buchenau 2003). A few of the 
churches are old religious buildings, said to belong to the clans of Njeguši 
or Cetinje, while others are converted or restored buildings.
Until now the CPC has only built one new church, which is found in 
Cetinje and named after Ivan Crnojević. The CPC does, however, lay claim 
to a number of buildings currently owned by the MML, and have tried on 
several occasions to forcefully take possession of them. Most of these dis-
puted buildings are in Old Montenegro and especially in the city of Cetinje. 
The CPC has also, without any confrontation so far, laid at least a cultural 
claim to an Islamic and a Roman Catholic site. The Catholic site in question 
is the man-made island and the church on it devoted to the Lady of the Lake 
(mng.: “Gospa od Skrpjela”) in the bay of Kotor. This site is devoted to a local 
holy woman and she is venerated in a ritual performed by the local inhab-
itants of the bay. The Islamic site in question is the shrine on the mountain 
Rumija devoted to a saint venerated by several Orthodox churches as well 
as the local Catholics and Muslims. Each year a local ritual is performed 
by all communities in order to venerate the saint. The CPC sees these two 
sites, along with the historical persons and the ritual connected with them, 
as genuinely Montenegrin and therefore a part of the CPC.
The CPC’s clergy and ecclesial organization
According to the CPC itself, its clergy consists of three vladikas, ten 
priests and one deacon (mng.: “trojicu vladika, deset svještenika i jednog 
đakona”, Lucindan 2009, p. 77). Compared to this the MML had at least an 
estimated 60 priests and 160 other forms of ecclesial personnel in 2003 (Bu-
chenau 2003) and the numbers have probably risen since then. However, it 
should be remarked that Alexander Stella (1979) reports that in 1979 the total 
numbers of MML priest (18) was equal to the number of CPC clergy today.
Noticeably, the CPC calls its bishops vladikas and not episkop or metro-
politans in its more informal texts. The title of vladika means ruler and is 
often translated to bishop-prince. The Metropolitan of Cetinje from around 
the 16th century used the title to designate the double nature of his office as 
both a secular and religious leader. The title of vladika is only used loose-
ly and in the official “constitution” of the CPC (Ustav Crnogorske Pravo-
slavne Crkve, 2009) the religious “leader” of the CPC is referred to as the 
Archbishop of Cetinje and the Metropolitan of Montenegro (mng.: “Arhi-
episkop Cetinjski i Mitropolit Crnogorski”, Paragraph 9, 2009). This title is 
very similar to the head of the MML. The CPC’s hierarchical order begins 
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with the Metropolitan and has six additional levels ranging from the bish-
op’s council to parish councils. Beside the hierarchy of the clergy, the line 
of management from the council of the Metropolitan down to each parish 
church is also established (Paragraph 7, 2009). The constitution of the CPC 
explains in details the scope of the church’s works. It ranges from what 
could be characterized as traditional Christian work, such as formal pro-
cedures of election of bishops (Paragraph 16.17–18, 2009) and more general 
Christian work, such as “keep and defend the purity of Christian Orthodox 
teachings on faith and morals” (mng.: “Čuva i brani čistotu hrišćanskoga 
pravoslavnoga učenja o vjeri i moralu”, Paragraph 16.6, 2009) and maintain-
ing internal unity (Paragraph 16.3). In addition to this traditional Christian 
service, the CPC also defines its work as preserving, protecting and devot-
ing attention to the Montenegrin ecclesial and historical materials, saints, 
texts etc. (Paragraphs 16.8, 17.23–24, 18.2–5, 2009). The CPC is divided up 
into the following dioceses/episcopates (mng.: “episkopije”, Paragraph 23):
•	 The Archbishopric of Cetinje, consisting of the Katunska nahija.
•	 The Episcopate of Duklja, consisting of the capital of Podgorica, the 
city of Danilograd and the ruins of the city of Duklja.
•	 The Coastal episcopate, centered in the city of Kotor and entailing all 
of Montenegro’s coastland (the Littoral).
•	 The Episcopate of Ostroški – Niksic, centered in the city of Niksic 
and its upland. The episcopate lays claim to the monastery of Ostrog, 
which is currently owned by the MML.
•	 The Episcopate of Bjelopoljska, centered in Bijelo Polje and including 
the northern Montenegrin municipalities.
•	 The Diaspora Episcopate.
One can see that the CPC’s internal division follow the borderline of the 
republic of Montenegro and most of the episcopates are built around the 
division of municipalities of Montenegro. This is in grave contrast with the 
MML, which only covers Old Montenegro and the coastland (the Littoral). 
The northern and western parts of Montenegro are included into other Ser-
bian eparchies (episcopates) – namely the “Mileševska” and the “Budmilje 
and Niksic” eparchies, which also include territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Serbia. The Budmilje and Niksic eparchy was restored in 2001 
and the Mileševska eparchy in 1999 (Džankić 2016, p. 143).
Furthermore, the constitution of the CPC also contains a section on the 
criteria one has to fulfill in order to become a bishop. This indicates the 
ideal form a senior member of the CPC clergy should be like. The consti-
tution states that a bishop in the CPC needs to be at least 30, have a higher 
theological education and be devoted to the church and the people/nation 
(mng.: “crkve I naroda”, Paragraph 24.5). He needs to be born in Montene-
gro and be a citizen (this does not apply to a bishop of the diaspora). The 
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episcopal office is thus reserved for Montenegrin citizens who are devoted 
to serving the people/nation.
Who are the members?
There are no official records nor a standardized national census provid-
ing a precise estimate of the number of members or Orthodox believers 
that adhere to the CPC. One could assume that there is a close correlation 
between being a member of the CPC and identifying oneself as a Montene-
grin (Džankić 2014). The members of the CPC could therefore be limited 
to the group of people in Montenegro that identify themselves as Montene-
grins. This is 45% of the total population, which is roughly 300,000 persons 
according to the 2011 census (Montestat 2011). This is the absolute maxi-
mum number of persons that the CPC could appeal to within Montenegro.
A qualified estimate of the total number of members could be found in 
the empirical research on the poltical landscape of Montenegro conducted 
by the Montenegrin Center for Democracy and Human Rights (Centar za 
demokratiju i ljudska prava, shortened to CEDEM). Over the past decade, 
CEDEM has continuously conducted two to three minor polls each year. 
These polls include from time to time questions regarding the religiousty 
of Montenegrin citizens. Two of their polls, from 2009 and 2015, show the 
percentage of Montenegrin citizens that identify themselves as members of 
the either the CPC or the MML (see table 3, CEDEM).
Table 3: Percentage of respondents that belong to the MML or the CPC
MML CPC
2009 52.20% 21.70%
2015 52.30% 15.60%
Source: Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, Montenegro
These two polls indicate that the Orthodox Christians in Montenegro, 
which make up 72% of the total population according to the 2011 census, 
are divided between the MML and the CPC. The majority of the population 
(52–53%) which is roughly two thirds of all Orthodox believers, attest that 
they belong to the MML, while the remaining minority, which is between 
16–22% of the total population and aproximately a third of Orthodox be-
lievers in Montenegro, belongs to the CPC. If these polls are crossed with 
the 2011 census, they thereby indicate that almost 50% of those Montene-
grin citizens that identify themselves as ethnic Montenegrins, do not sup-
port the CPC but the MML. This information suggests that half of Monte-
negrins connect their national identity with their religious affiliation, while 
the other half doesn’t. The two polls indicate therefore that aproximately 
150,000 Montenegrins in Montenegro are members of the CPC. This number 
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seems, however, to be an overestimation considering the size of the clergy 
and the number of churches belonging to the CPC. This overetsimation 
could be based on the fact that the respondents had to choose between the 
CPC and the MML, which forced them to take a stand that they might not 
have taken otherwise. The polls were also conducted with a minor group 
of respondents (aprox. 1,000 persons) and might therefore not precisely re-
flect the scale of the CPC. Furthermore, the polls might not show the actu-
al number of members but rather the size of the population that passively 
supports the CPC without actively engaging in CPC activity.
This estimation flickers a bit further when one takes another line of ob-
servation from CEDEM into account. CEDEM has also asked on a regular 
basis if Montenegrin citizens “trust” in specific institutions, such as the par-
liament, the military, the MML and the CPC. This provides a long series of 
observation displayed in figure 1.
Figure 1: Percentage of respondents that “trust” in the MML and the CPC 
from 2010 to 2016
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2016(2)2016(1)2015(2)2015(1)201420132012(2)2012(1)2011(2)2011(1)2010
Source: Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, Montenegro
The median is 52.7% for the MML and 27.6% for the CPC for all obser-
vations from 2010 to 2016. The median reveals that, statiscally speaking, 
27.6% of the total population “trust” the CPC as an institution. This could 
be interpreted as support. This percentage of supporters is not far from the 
estimation of the number of members in CEDEM’s other polls. This under-
lines perhaps that table 3 shows the percentage of passive supporters of the 
CPC rather than its actual members.
A correlation to CEDEM’s polls is another poll from 2011 which was de-
signed by a research group (Kolstø 2016). This 2011 poll indicates a somewhat 
different picture. In this poll, less than ca. 16% of the ethnic Montenegrin 
population identify themselves with the CPC. This is far less than the esti-
mation from CEDEM. In contrast to this small group, the majority of eth-
nic Montenegrins, which is 58%, would rather describe themselves with the 
rather bland label of “Eastern Orthodox”. The 58% thereby signal that they 
belong to neither the MML nor the CPC. This 2011 poll therefore estimates 
the total number of CPC members around ca. 47,000, if it is crossed with 
the 2011 census. A conservative estimate may therefore be that ca. 47,000 
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persons are firm and loyal members of the CPC, while at least 150,000 peo-
ple in Montenegro sympathize with the CPC on some level.
A further correlation to these numbers is found in the budget of the CPC 
from 2009. Here, the CPC’s treasury informs that 4,265 payments have been 
made to the CPC. (Lucindan 2009, p. 69): 2,800 from legal entities and 1,465 
from physical persons (mng.: “2.800 pravna lica i 1.465 fizička lica”). It is 
not made explicit what those two labels cover, but a qualified guess is that 
fizička lica is literally a single person donating and that pravna lica covers 
families, clans, villages or organizations of some sort. This provides enough 
information to assume that at least 4,265 persons have made the choice to 
donate money to the CPC. This group – combined with the clergy and oth-
er officials – could be considered as the core base of believers for the CPC.
In total, the sources mentioned above could be used to estimate the total 
size of the CPC. First and foremost there seems to be a base of firm and ac-
tive believers comprising approximately 5,000 individuals. Secondly, there 
is a group of ca. 47,000 persons that belong to the CPC, which is 16% of all 
ethnic Montenegrins. Thirdly, around ca. 150,000 persons in Montenegro 
somewhat sympathize with the CPC. The size of this last group is perhaps 
the most difficult one to determine. The polls from CEDEM suggest that 
the group is between 16 and 30% of the total population. Finally, there are 
ca. 300,000 persons in Montenegro to whom the CPC could appeal to. The 
numbers mentioned above are estimations based on the demographics of 
Montenegro. It should be noted that the number of firm believers might 
have been higher during the formation of the CPC. Morrison reports that 
15,000 people showed up to the foundational celebration of the CPC in Cetin-
je in 1993 (2009, p. 131). These 15.000 must have been strong supporters of 
the CPC and could be characterized as the core members of the early CPC.
Figure 2: Demographics of the CPC
4.
3.
2.
1.
5,000
47,000
150,000
300,000
Key: 1: The firm believers; 2: Those that identify themselves with the CPC; 
3: Those that sympathize with the CPC; 4: Those that the CPC can appeal to
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The recent history of the CPC
The CPC was formally founded in 1993, but has existed roughly since the 
All-Montenegrin National Synod in 1991 and functioned as an NGO until 
its official recognition in 2000. Below is a list of the most significant events 
in the recent history of the CPC.
Table 5: List of events relating to the CPC 1991–2013
Year Event
2013 October: Celebration of Njegoš
2010 20 January: Clash at Church of St. John the Baptist in Bajice
2008 October: Meeting with the Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Moldavian non-recognized churches
2007 18 April: Clash between CPC and MML supporters at Cetinje monastery
2005 May: The MML build the controversial Rumija church
2000
Easter: The CPC receives greetings from the 
Prime Minister of Montenegro.
January: Official recognition by the Montenegrin state
17 January: Clash between CPC and MML 
supporters at Donji Kraj church
1997/98 The election and elevation of vladika Dedic/Mihailo
1996 The death of the first vladika, Abramovich
1993 31 October: The founding of the CPC on St. Petar’s death day
1991
12 July: Clash between CPC supporters and a Serbian 
armed militia on St. Petar’s day in Cetinje
6 January: The All-Montenegrin National Synod
January: The first badjnak
The recent history of the CPC is centered around two crucial periods. 
The first one is the early nineties (1991–1993) where the CPC became estab-
lished as a spearhead for the Liberals and Montenegrin nationalists in their 
reaction towards the MML. A central event was the bloody St Petar’s day, 
where a Serbian armed militia started shooting at a Montenegrin demon-
stration in Cetinje. This event convinced many locals in Cetinje that the 
MML stood in the way of the Montenegrin nationalist movement and that 
consequently the CPC needed to be founded in order to counter the MML 
(Morrison 2009). Following its foundation in 1993, the CPC struggled to 
become an established community and put its organization into place. A 
significant amount of energy was expended to secure the transferal of the 
office of Metropolitan from the first vladika Abramovich to the second vla-
dika Mihailo.
The second crucial period for the CPC began in 2000 when the con-
frontation between the MML and CPC was put to the test. The recogni-
tion of the CPC in that year became a point of departure for a CPC-lead 
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campaign which sought to take back all Montenegrin shrines built before 
1920. This period culminated in 2007 shortly after the referendum with-
out the CPC being able to overtake any shrines owned by the MML. The 
CPC leadership seemed to have hoped that Montenegrin independence 
would pave the way for their control over the central churches and mon-
asteries in Montenegro. Instead of being welcomed by the Montenegrin 
authorities, they were, in stark contrast to their expectations, confront-
ed by a Montenegrin police force protecting the MML on 18 April 2007. 
Following 2007, the CPC has been stabilized and institutionalized with a 
new constitution, the rebuilding of churches and a continual presence at 
official state events, such as the celebration of Njegoš in 2013.
This timeline is to a large extent reflected in the writings of the church 
and their supporters. The majority of texts defending the church in pro-
Montenegrin magazines, such as the Matica crnogorska or the CPC’s own 
publication Lučindan, are dated from around 2000 and up until a few years 
after the 2006 referendum.
The cultic and ritual praxis of the CPC
In general, the CPC invokes Christian language, holidays and rituals 
as part of the clergy’s praxis which is described in details in the magazine 
Lučindan, such as Metropolitan Mihailo’s greeting to the CPC at Easter 
(Lučindan 2013). To the extent that is visible in its outlet, the CPC should be 
characterized as a Christian community. There is, however, often a paucity 
when it comes to biblical references, which is perhaps more due the lack of 
deep theological training than an expression of a theological stand. It is hard 
to determine if this form of Christianity is a deep commitment to the Chris-
tian faith or simply a structural and cultural garment for the community.
Beside the traditional Christian structures, rituals and holidays, the 
CPC’s praxis is based on a revivalist interpretation of what Montenegrin 
Christendom should be like. An example of this is the use of the title vla-
dika rather than the title of bishop or metropolitan. Vladika invokes a lo-
cal tradition of Christian rule, rather than the long episcopal succession 
expressed in the title of bishop.
The CPC’s main national characteristic is also found in the so-called 
“sainted Montenegrin cult” (mng.: култу Црногорославља), which consist 
of a list of saints that the CPC venerates in particular. These saints are espe-
cially bond to the history of the Montenegrin lands and the former medieval 
states of Duklja and Zeta. However, two of the saints are also venerated by 
the MML and other Orthodox churches. The CPC describes the essences 
of these saints as the fight for (Montenegrin) freedom and they are used as 
ideal-figures exemplifying the Montenegrin’s right to an independent state 
(Lučindan 2009, p. 37). The five most central are as follows:
Emil Hilton Saggau, “The self-proclaimed Montenegrin Orthodox Church…” 43
Table 6: List of national saints
Name of cult Historical person Historical period Known for
Vladimiroslavlja
Jovan or Ivan 
Vladimir, unkown 
family – perhaps 
Vojislavljević
Early 
medieval 
990–1016
First ruler of the 
Montenegrin area. First 
locally known saint.
Vasilioslavlja
Vojislavljević – A 
line of rulers, the 
best known of 
which are Stefan, 
Mihailo I and 
Constantine Bodin
Early 
medieval 
1034–1186
The ruling dynasty of 
independent Duklja.
First local Slavic 
independent royal house 
– ousted by the Serbian 
house of Nemanjić.
Stefanoslavlja Probably Stefan Piperski
Ottoman 
period 
Unknown 
birth – 
20/21 May 
1697
Local Montenegrin 
saint – founded the Ćelija 
piperska monastery in 
Brda outside Podgorica.
Ivanoslavlja Ivan Crnojević
Late 
medieval 
1465–1490
Lord of the Zeta – 
Montenegrin state, 
founder of Cetinje and 
the Cetinje monastery.
Petroslavlja Petar I Petrović-Njegoš 1748–1830
Sainted vladika of the 
Petrović-Njegoš dynasty 
of Montenegro.
Modernized Montenegro 
and known as Petar 
of Cetinje.
Source: “Uloga Svještenstva”, Lučindan 33, 2010, p. 83
This national characteristic of the CPC is also found in their calendar of 
religious celebrations. According to the CPC, their church celebrates most 
of the Christian and Eastern Orthodox holidays, such as Christmas, the 
Epiphany (19 January), the prayer to the Theokotos (14 October) and so on. 
The special CPC holidays are the following:
Table 6: List of specific national holidays
Name Date (Julian/Gregorian) Refers to Celebrated at
St. Basil of Ostrog 12 May / 29 April
The venerated founder of 
the monastery of Ostrog 
(near Danilograd)
Ostrog 
monastery
Holy Stefan 
Piperski 2 June / 20 May
The venerated founder 
of the monastery of 
Piperski (near Podgorica)
Piperski 
monastery
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Holy martyr 
Vladimir of Duklja 4 June / 22 May Jovan or Ivan Vladimir
Mount Rumija 
and city of Bar
Holy and just 
Ivana Crnojevića 4 July / 21 June Ivan Crnojević
Cetinje 
monastery 
and churches
St. Peter from 
Cetinje, the 
wonderworker
31 October 
(calender 
unknown)
Petar I Petrović-Njegoš Cetinje monastery
Lučindan
18 October 
(calender 
unknown)
Luke’s day
Badjnak Christmas (Julian calendar)
Cetinje main 
square
Petrovodan 29 June (calender unknown)
St. Petar I Petrović-
Njegoš’ birthday
Cetinje 
monastery
Source: “Praznici”, Lucindan 37, 2010, p. 50
Noticeably, four of the local Montenegrin cults are turned into holidays 
and another one is added. One central feature of all the celebrated holidays is 
that the person venerated is bound to a very specific geographical and often 
physical space (e.g. a monastery). Most of these places are today controlled 
by the MML. The CPC underline, through their veneration, their claim on 
Montenegro’s physical heritage through a spiritual argument (Saggau 2017a). 
One of the most central holidays and rituals is the badjnak. The badjnak is 
a local ritual – used throughout Eastern Europe. It is centered on the burn-
ing of a large Yule log (or sometimes just a bonfire) at Christmas Eve. Every 
year the MML and the CPC each hold a badjnak only a few hundred meters 
apart. The MML burns its logs in front of the monastery in Cetinje, while the 
CPC burns its logs in front of the last Petrovich-Njegoš palace in a central 
square in Cetinje. During the badjnak, nationalist songs are sung by both 
crowds and they wave Serbian or Montenegrin national flags. The reason 
the CPC continues to hold on to the date of the Badjnak is not only just a 
yearly provocation towards the MML. Christmas has a cultural history of 
its own in Montenegro. Three key historical events occurred at Christmas 
in Montenegro that made the holiday into a national and cultural event that 
transgresses the limited symbolism of Christianity.3
3 The holiday is the center of Petar II Petrovich-Njegoš’ (1813–1851) epic about his 
forefather vladika Danilo Petrovich-Njegoš. In the epic, Danilo leads Montenegrin 
Orthodox believers as they slaughter the Montenegrin Muslims that refuse to con-
vert on Christmas. The so-called “cleansing” of Montenegro is a mythological (or 
some argue real) tale of Montenegrin freedom from the Muslim. In addition to this 
tale, the Montenegrins have on two other occasions risen to arms during Christ-
mas. First and foremost in a Montenegrin national uprising during the formation 
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 in a so-called civil war. The 
second occasion was during Montenegro’s occupation by Italian forces during the 
Second world war.
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A religio-social mapping of the CPC
So far this article has dealt with the basic structure of the CPC which 
provides some insights into the organization. In the following paragraph, 
these findings will be supplemented with a religio-social mapping of the 
CPC within Montenegrin society. Such mapping is based on a country’s le-
gal norms and its political discourse, which constructs structures through 
which the religious organizations can act. Such structures could be described 
as belonging to specific models describing the relationship between church 
and state. Silvio Ferrari, a professor of law and religion, maps such structures 
into three governing models. The first model is that of a separation system, 
where the state and religious communities are separated from each other – 
such as in the French laicity system. The second is called a concordat system, 
which is built on explicit agreements between state and church, such as in 
Spain. And the third system is called a national church system with estab-
lished national churches, such as in Denmark or England (Ferrari 2002).
In the Montenegrin context, the relationship between the state and reli-
gious communities is not well described and there isn’t a comprehensive le-
gal framework in place. Various parties and religious communities strongly 
disagree on the matter and thus no new laws pertaining to religion have 
been passed since independence in 2006 despite a few failed attempts. The 
relationship between the state and the religious communities is therefore 
rather loose and only vaguely prescribed in the constitution and some mi-
nor by-laws on religious education, culture etc.
Montenegro’s constitution (Ustav Crne Gore 2007) from 2007 is based 
on a western model. Article 46 states that there is freedom of religion in 
Montenegro and that all “religious communities shall be separated from 
the state” (article 14). Article 14 explicitly declares the state to be secular. 
This is to some extent softened in other paragraphs where the constitution 
allows religious communities and individuals to exercise and express their 
religion as well as establish religious organizations with the support of the 
state. Religious organizations are also allowed to maintain contact with oth-
er religious organizations outside of Montenegro, such as the papal church. 
The by-laws on religion require that the religious communities register at 
a local police office, which will inform the Ministry of Interior about the 
registration. Being registered entitles organizations to own property, hold 
bank accounts and receive a tax exemption. There are twenty registered re-
ligious communities at the present time (International Religious Freedom 
Report 2015).
The Montenegrin state could, according to Ferrari’s models, best be char-
acterized as a separation system on a general level, where church and state 
have nothing to do with each other. However, the content of the some of the 
constitution’s articles, some of the Montenegrin by-laws and the agreements 
between the state and some of the religious communities, points to the fact 
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that in practice the Montenegrin state formulates explicit agreements with 
religious communities.4 This suggest that on a practical level, the Monte-
negrin church-state relationship is rather a concordat system according to 
Ferrari’s models. This mixture of models seems partly to be the unintended 
side-effect caused by the lack of a comprehensive legal system for religion.
To further qualify the characterization of the relationship between church 
and state, Ferrari also introduces a “pyramid of priority” (see fig 3). The 
pyramid depicts the degrees of relations to and cooperation with the state. 
It reveals a compartmentalisation of religious communities in a religious 
landscape. The basic logic of the pyramid is that religious communities 
can increase their cooperation with the state, which in turn will increase 
their influence and positional power while at the same time subdue them 
to greater state control (Vinding 2013).
Figur 3: The Silvio Ferrari pyramid of priority 
of selective state co-operation
“...climbing from rst to the 
second platform of the 
pyramid is subjected to 
some kind of State 
registration or 
recognition, that is to 
some kind of State 
control...”
(Ferrari 2002: 10)  
1st level of the pyramid 
“...the religious communities whose co-operating with 
State is very scarce...”
(Ferrari 2002: 10) 
- no nancial support
- no access to public media
- no teaching of doctrine in school 
2nd level of the pyramid
“...a second group of religious communities 
has a middle position [...] these communities 
are regulated by special laws enacted for religious 
associations...”
(Ferrari 2002: 10) 
3rd 
level 
of the 
pyramid
“...the religious 
groups that enjoy 
the maximum degree 
of State co-operation...”
(Ferrari 2002: 11) 
Declining degree of selective State co-operation with religious com
m
unities
Source: Vinding, 2013, p. 44
The pyramid could be applied to the Montenegrin context to shed some 
light on the positions of the various religious communities in relation to the 
state. Close to the state are in fact the Muslim, Roman Catholic and Jewish 
4 See for example The General Law on Education (Opšti zakon o obrazovanju i vaspi-
tanju 2013) and the formal agreement between the Roman Catholic Church and 
the Montenegrin state (Catholics Temeljni ugovor Crne Gore i Svete Stolice 2011). 
See Saggau, Pacariz & Bakrač, 2017.
Emil Hilton Saggau, “The self-proclaimed Montenegrin Orthodox Church…” 47
communities in Montenegro. They inhabit the third level of the pyramid. 
These three communities have been able to form a direct agreement with 
the state about their rights, responsibilities and the resources that are avail-
able to them. Each of them is a minority religion and this status has per-
haps provided them with the close link to the state. The Montenegrin gov-
ernment has been keen on preserving and protecting minorities in order 
to qualify for inclusion in the EU, and also as the government has heavily 
relied on the (non-Serbian) minority parties in parliament for support. The 
relation to the (non-Serbian) minorities has not been a major or controver-
sial issue in Montenegro. The state’s relationship to these minority religions 
must be understood to have undergone a process of general formalization 
after independence.
Most of Montenegro’s other religious organizations including the CPC 
are to be classified in the second level of the pyramid. These organizations 
are registered and are allowed to own land and practise their religion, but 
none of them have a formal agreement with the state. Finally, the MML could 
be described as being between the second and the first level of the pyramid: 
on the one hand the MML are registered and exist under the same laws as 
the CPC, but on the other hand there are several unclear relations, espe-
cially when it comes to for example the right to property, religious educa-
tion and the movements of clergy members between the former republics of 
Yugoslavia. Several high profiled cases, a series of lawsuits and accusations 
have, since the early 2000s, tainted the relationship between the current 
government and the MML (Morrison 2009, Radio Slobodan Evropa 2016). 
The degree of cooperation between the state and the MML could at best be 
described as minor and, likewise, the MML is only to a minor degree gov-
erned by the Montenegrin state. The MML is, however, subordinate to the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and therefore partly governed by the Serbian 
state in matters such as the education of priests etc. (Metropolitante 2013). 
Montenegro is still a young state and its legal framework is therefore still 
dynamic. The current government under the leadership of the Democrat-
ic Party of Socialists (mng.: Demokratska partija socijalista – hereon DPS) 
and the Montenegrin state are very much overlapping. Many state officials 
are party members. The individual relationship between various religious 
communities and high-ranking members of the DPS therefore forms the 
pyramid. This is unlike other states where these relations are much more 
formalized. The relations between the state and the communities – espe-
cially when it comes to the MML and the CPC – would very much change, 
if the opposition came into power.
In order to understand the CPC’s place in Montenegrin society, one has 
to recall the two major religio-social characteristic of the CPC. They have 
first of all since their foundation been narrowly identified with the Monte-
negrin nationalist movement in all its aspects. The base of members is in 
Old Montenegro and this base only covers those that identify themselves 
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as “ethnic Montenegrins”, that is to say between 16 and 50% of all Monte-
negrins. Secondly, the CPC is therefore connected to pro-Montenegrin na-
tionalist parties, such as the Liberals or the Social Democratic Party (mng.: 
Socijaldemokratska partija), and not directly to the DPS. This position part-
ly explains why they inhabit the second level rather than the third in the 
pyramid of priorities. The CPC is not close enough to the DPS in order to 
obtain a status as a national church, and the DPS are very well aware that a 
substantial part of the electoral base (mainly moderate Montenegrins) are 
not members of the CPC. On the other hand, the DPS needs to recognize 
the CPC on some level because the DPS has historically relied on the Lib-
erals and the Social Democratic Party to remain in power (Morrison 2009, 
p. 141). In contrast, the MML is identified as a branch of a Serbian cultural 
organization, which according to the DPS is alien to the Montenegrin state. 
This links the MML to the various Serbian-based opposition parties, which 
the DPS regards as its opponents. The MML and the DPS thus don’t fully 
cooperate, which was put to the point in the discussion over the Lovćen site 
during the Njegoš jubilee in 2013 (Saggau 2017b).
This pyramid and state-models could be used to illustrate the dynamics 
in concrete situations like. The controversial Easter greetings to both the 
MML and the CPC by the DPS prime minister Đukanović in 2000. Tradi-
tionally, the head of the state would only greet the MML on Easter in the 
same manner as greetings are sent to the Muslim or Roman Catholic com-
munities during their religious festivities. The seasonal greeting in 2000 
was in contrast sent to both communities and was the first official greeting 
from a head of state to the CPC (Buchennau 2003). Shortly afterwards, it was 
followed by the official recognition of the CPC. The MML reacted harshly 
over this positive treatment of the CPC (Šistek 2010, p. 127). This event il-
lustrates how the CPC moved up in the pyramid from the first to the sec-
ond level expressed in the greeting and the recognition. They moved from 
being an unrecognized NGO into being a regulated religious community. 
The CPC became – on a social-religious and juridical-state level – an equal 
to the MML. The MML’s harsh reaction was against the state’s endorsing 
of the CPC rather that the greeting itself. It was against the juridical and 
societal equalization. The MML was not removed from the list of greetings, 
but kept their position in the pyramid. However, they were forced to share 
this position with the CPC and their positional power in the Montenegrin 
society became threatened.
 
The institutional form of the CPC
The CPC’s place and role in Montenegrin society is partly determined by 
how its members, its supporters and its opponents view the organization. 
In the following paragraph, these perspectives on the CPC will be treated. 
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The core believers and most ardent supports view the CPC as an ecclesial 
organization characterized by Christian liturgy, priests, worships and can-
on laws. Several writings, such as in Goran Sekulović article “Crnogorska 
identitetska prava i slobode” (2010), argue that the CPC is an Eastern Or-
thodox Church and that it is a natural prolongation of the “Mother” church 
of Montenegro from before 1920. Their main arguments and their impli-
cations in a theological sense are treated elsewhere (Saggau 2014), but they 
leave very little doubt about their view on the CPC. Likewise the views of 
the MML and other pro-Serbian organizations, newspapers etc. on the CPC 
are quite clear. In short the MML views the CPC as a tool for the Montene-
grin nationalist movement used in order to challenge the MML’s status in 
Montenegro. The metropolitan of the MML, Amfilohije Radović, has writ-
ten a short text called “The Church as the Pillar and Stronghold of the Truth 
– The Question of Autocephaly and the Church”, which expounded this posi-
tion on a theological level. Remarkably, most studies of the CPC reach the 
same conclusion as the MML (see Morrison 2009, Šistek 2010, Kube 2012, 
Jelena Džankić 2013 & 2014a & 2014b & 2016, and Troch 2014).
Booth perspectives on the CPC reveal elements of its form. Its members 
and close supporters treat the organization as a church in a religio-socio-
logical sense. On the other hand, as the mapping showed, the CPC plays a 
cultural-political role for the Montenegrin nationalist movement that the 
MML criticizes the CPC for. However, these two views on the CPC do not 
reveal all of its features because they are crafted either in positive support 
or a negative response.
In contrast it might be more fruitful to understand the CPC organiza-
tion religio-sociologically as a “new” revivalist religion. This does not mean 
that their content is new, but rather that they are a new religious organiza-
tion and therefore act as such. Eileen Barker, a religio-sociologist, points 
out that adolescent religious organizations act almost in similar patterns, 
because they are both religious and new (2013). The most noticeable char-
acteristics are that they are small in numbers, that their interactions are 
on a face-to-face level and that they are centered around one leader (often 
charismatic). They are highly unpredictable and their core members are 
(as many first-generation religious) very enthusiastic (Barker 2013, p. 14). 
The CPC holds all these traits, positions and attitudes that are character-
istic for new religious movements. The CPC is small, centered around one 
leader and its members are very enthusiastic. Its members often argue in a 
traditionalist, a nationalist or a revivalist pattern, which are often bound 
together and inseparable.
with Barker’s point in mind, it makes therefore perhaps much better 
sense to describe the CPC as a religious organization characterized as both 
new and revivalist. On one hand, its “newness” defines its size, its form 
of organization and its core members. On the other hand, its “revivalism” 
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defines the reuse of Montenegrin cultural and religious heritage, which ap-
peals to Montenegrin citizens characterized as nationalist or traditionalist.
A paper tiger or a resurgent church?
As the above socio-religious description and discussions point out, the 
CPC exists and enjoys to some extent the backing of the parts of the Mon-
tenegrin population. The CPC is still a minor community with only few 
churches, a minimum of ecclesial organization and clergy as well as a few 
faithful believers. It is hard to determine the extent of the impact of the 
community on the life of everyday Montenegrins, but it’s safe to say that 
the CPC is very much embedded into the social life of Old Montenegro, the 
heartland of Montenegrin nationalism. Alice Forbess (2013) and Aleksander 
Zdravkovski and Kenneth Morrison (2014) note that especially in the peri-
od after the referendum in 2006 there has been a blooming of Montenegrin 
cultural awareness in Old Montenegro. The use of Montenegrin symbols, 
flags and songs has been predominant at social events. In that sense the 
CPC is part of a resurgent cultural and religious praxis for this group and 
in that area – which partly explains why its churches and claims to church-
es are limited to this area. Its place in this resurgent cultural movement is 
the background for its revivalist form of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
The CPC has to some degree been successful in claiming a religious role 
in the new state. This role is secured through a status as a religious com-
munity in Montenegro, but this position does at the same time not really 
challenge the MML. Therefore the CPC’s threat to the MML is still just a 
paper tiger, because physically, demographically and financially the MML 
overshadows the CPC. It is only on paper that the CPC can challenge the 
MML without the full backing from the DPS and subsequently the state. 
Such backing would require overwhelming support from the Montene-
grin majority to the CPC, and that seems highly unlikely according to 
the polls. The DPS is therefore not interested in challenging the MML se-
riously on behalf of the CPC, because it is too risky both financially, po-
litically and could endanger the peaceful coexistence between Serbs and 
Montenegrins in the state. The DPS favors to maintain the status-quo. 
Most analysts have labeled the CPC as a nationalist agent rather than a church 
(Šistek 2010) and have called the community “ein Elitenprojekt” (Kube 2012, 
p. 130). This is true in that sense that the CPC only appeals to an elite group 
of Montenegrin nationalists, but, as the demographics show, a larger group 
of Montenegrins do sympathize with the project. The CPC’s religious praxis 
appeal to a small but key group of Montenegrins that shape the large frame 
through which Montenegrins interpret their culture, history, language, religion 
and ethnicity. This does not mean that the large group of Montenegrins would 
in the long run becomes members of the CPC, but rather that they live and 
understand themselves in relation to the supporters of the CPC. It is one-sided 
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to only portray the CPC as nationalistic, because it also contains traits of 
being a revivalist, new and even traditional form of religion. The CPC con-
tains all of these features due to the cultural and religious context it draws on. 
The CPC is a nationalist organization, which its cultic praxis points towards, 
but this is not the whole picture. The veneration of national saints and holi-
days reveals both the nationalism, the revivalism and the traditionalism at 
play when Montenegrin culture, places and historical persons take promi-
nence in the CPC.
Interestingly, the recent history of the CPC mirrors the social and politi-
cal changes Montenegro has been through since the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
The birth of the CPC out of the turmoil of the civil war in 1991–1995 fore-
shadowed the watershed in Montenegrin politics in 1996, where the DPS 
elite set out on the road towards independence. The point of no return po-
litically and religiously came in 2000, when the DPS leader both renounced 
the union with Serbia and greeted the CPC as an equal to the MML. The 
road towards independence was paved. And finally, the period since the 
declaration of independence has been used on stabilization of the Monte-
negrin state and the CPC.
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